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Abstract
We examine a model of price competition where the ﬁrms simulta-
neously decide on both price and quantity, and are free to supply less
than the quantity demanded. We demonstrate that if the tie-breaking
rule is ‘non-manipulable’, then, for a large class of rationing rules, there
is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever the number of ﬁrms
is large enough. We then show that the ‘folk theorem’ of perfect com-
petition holds. Finally, we examine if the results go through when the
ﬁrms are asymmetric, or produce to order.
JEL Classiﬁcation Number: D43, D41, L13.
Key words: Bertrand equilibrium, pure strategy, ‘non-manipulable’ tie-
breaking rule.
e-mail: prabalrc@isid.ac.in1 Introduction
Let us consider a Bertrand duopoly where the ﬁrms decide on both their
price and output levels and the ﬁrms are free to supply less than the quantity
demanded. Edgeworth (1897) argues that in such models equilibria in pure
strategies may not exist.1 In this paper we seek to establish that if the
number of ﬁrms is large enough, then, for a ‘large’ class of residual demand
functions, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover,
this equilibrium exhibits some interesting limit properties.
We focus on the case where the ﬁrms make their price and output de-
cisions simultaneously, though we also examine the model where the ﬁrms
produce to order. We examine a class of residual demand function with
a rationing rule that is satisﬁed by almost ‘all’ rationing rules (except the
proportional one) and a ‘non-manipulable’ tie-breaking rule. Suppose that
several ﬁrms are charging the same price. We say that the tie-breaking rule
is ‘non-manipulable’ if, by increasing their output level, none of these ﬁrms
can increase the residual demand coming to it.
In this paper we allow the price level to vary over a grid, where the
size of the grid can be arbitrarily small. There are generally two problems
associated with the existence of pure strategy equilibrium under price com-
petition. The ﬁrst reason is technical and has to do with the well known
open-set problem. The second one has to do with the fact that the proﬁt
function of a ﬁrm may not be quasi-concave in its own price. The grid as-
sumption allows us to side-step the open set problem, and solve, at least
when the number of ﬁrms is large enough, what we believe is the essential
Edgeworth paradox. This assumption can also be motivated by appealing
to the practice of integer pricing, or to the fact that there are minimum cur-
rency denominations. Some other papers that model such discrete pricing
1See Dixon (1987), or Friedman (1988) for formal statements of the problem, often
referred to in the literature as the Edgeworth paradox.
1include, Dixon (1993), Harrington (1989), Maskin and Tirole (1988), Ray
Chaudhuri (1995), Roy Chowdhury (1999) and Roy Chowdhury (2002).2
We demonstrate that if the number of ﬁrms is large enough, then a
unique Nash equilibrium exists. We then discuss the limit properties of this
equilibrium as one takes the number of ﬁrms to inﬁnity. However, relative
to market demand, ﬁrm size is kept constant.3 We ﬁnd that in the limit
as the grid size becomes very small, and the number of ﬁrms becomes very
large, the price level approaches the competitive one and the output level of
each ﬁrm becomes vanishingly small.
This result is a vindication of the ‘folk theorem’ of perfect competi-
tion, which suggests that the perfectly competitive outcome can be inter-
preted as the limit of some oligopolistic equilibrium as the number of ﬁrms
becomes large. While this issue has been thoroughly investigated in the
context of Cournot competition,4 in the Bertrand framework this question
remains relatively unexplored. In our model the competitive price is ob-
tained in the limit even though ﬁrms are price-setters, thereby providing a
non-cooperative foundation for perfect competition in the context of price
competition.
We then go on to argue that similar results hold even if the ﬁrms play
a two stage game, where in stage 1 the ﬁrms decide on their price, and in
stage 2 they decide on their output.
We next examine the case where the cost functions are asymmetric.
The results for the symmetric case generalize in a natural fashion when the
marginal cost at zero is the same for all ﬁrms. If the marginal cost at zero
is diﬀerent for diﬀerent types, then the earlier results go through if it is the
2In models with discrete strategy spaces, Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a) discuss the
sensitivity of equilibrium outcomes to the size of the grid.
3Other papers to employ this limiting procedure include Ruﬃn (1971) (in case of
Cournot competition) and Tasn´ adi (1999a) (in case of price competition).
4See, for example, Novshek (1980) and Novshek and Sonnenschein (1983).
2number of ‘eﬃcient’ ﬁrms that is taken to inﬁnity. Otherwise, an equilibrium
may fail to exist.
We then relate our paper to the literature.
There are diﬀerent ways of modelling a game of price competition. Un-
der the production to stock (or PTS) approach, the ﬁrms simultaneously
decide on both their price and output levels. One way to interpret this
game is as one with advance production, so that ﬁrms must decide on their
output levels before trading starts. Thus they make their price and output
decisions without knowing the price and output decisions of the other ﬁrms.
Retail markets are often characterized by such production conditions (see
Mestelman et al. (1987)).
This framework has been examined, among others, by Dixon (1987),
Dixon (1993) and Maskin (1986).5 While Maskin (1986) proves existence
in mixed strategies, Dixon (1987, 1993) look for equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. Dixon (1987) introduces the notion of menu costs and demonstrates
that in the presence of such costs there is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies if the economy is replicated. Dixon (1993) examines the ex-
istence of pure strategy equilibria when costs are convex and price varies
discretely. There two papers, however, diﬀer from our paper in several re-
spects. To begin with the replication procedure is quite diﬀerent. While
under our approach the market demand is kept unchanged, Dixon (1987,
1993) replicate the market demand function as well, so that individual ﬁrms
become small relative to market demand. Moreover, while Dixon (1993)
examines a parallel residual demand function, our results apply to almost
‘all’ residual demand functions (except the proportional one), provided the
tie-breaking rule is ‘non-manipulable’. In terms of results, Dixon (1993)
ﬁnds that equilibria are non-unique and may not exist for some parameter
5In fact, Shubik (1955) formulates a production to stock game, but does not analyze
it, merely pointing out the diﬃculties in analyzing such a game. Of course, both Maskin
(1986) and Shubik (1955) also examine other game forms.
3values. Moreover, the highest equilibrium price could be arbitrarily far from
the competitive price. In contrast, we ﬁnd that for large markets, equilib-
rium is unique, always exists and the equilibrium price approximates the
competitive price arbitrarily closely.6
Under the production to order (or PTO) approach, the ﬁrms ﬁrst simul-
taneously decide on their price levels and then on their output levels. Papers
in this framework include Dixon (1990), Maskin (1986), Yoshida (2002) etc.
Maskin (1986) proves existence in mixed strategies, while Yoshida (2002)
characterizes the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for a duopoly with
identical, strictly convex costs. On the other hand, Dixon (1990) shows that
if there are costs of turning away customers then a pure strategy equilibrium
exists if the economy is replicated.
One interesting class of models assumes that cost functions are linear
and capacity constrained. Firms compete over prices and, given prices, are
willing to supply till capacity.7 Papers in this framework include Allen and
Hellwig (1986, 1993), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b), Osborne and Pitchik
(1986), Vives (1986) etc.8 These papers solve for equilibria in mixed strate-
gies, sometimes using the ﬁxed point theorems for discontinuous games de-
veloped by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a).
In an interesting paper Mestelman et al. (1987) use laboratory exper-
iments to compare the PTS approach with the PTO one. They ﬁnd that
under the PTS approach, market prices tend to be lower compared to the
PTO approach. Moreover, with repeated play, the market price under the
6Dixon (1992) examines a model where ﬁrms announces a price and the maximum
quantity it is willing to supply at that price. In such models even two ﬁrms are suﬃcient
to generate the competitive outcome.
7In fact, in some of these papers the cost of production is assumed to be zero. In that
case this class of models can be interpreted as one of price competition with a given stock
of output (see Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b)).
8Tasn´ adi (1999a) examines a PTS framework with linear and capacity constrained cost
functions.
4PTS approach converges quickly to the competitive one.
Finally, Davidson and Deneckere (1986) and Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) assume that ﬁrms ﬁrst decide on their capacity levels and then on
prices. This approach diﬀers from the PTS approach in that the ﬁrms know
the capacity level of the other ﬁrms when they make their pricing decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and
analyzes the basic model. Section 3 considers the production to order game.
Section 4 extends the analysis to the asymmetric case. Section 5 concludes.
Some of the technical details can be found in Appendix 1 and 2.
2 The Model
There are n identical ﬁrms, all producing the same homogeneous good.9 The
market demand function is q = d(p) and the common cost function of all
the ﬁrms is c(q).10
Throughout we maintain the following assumptions on the demand and
the cost functions.
Assumption 1. d(p) is negatively sloped and intersects the price axis
at some price pmax, where 0 < pmax < ∞.
Assumption 2. The cost function c(q) is twice diﬀerentiable, increasing
and strictly convex. Moreover, pmax > c0(0).
We assume that prices vary over a grid. Deﬁne the set of feasible prices
F = {p0,p1,···}, where p0 = 0, and pi = pi−1 + α, ∀i ∈ {1,2,···}, where
α > 0.
9Another strand of the literature examines price competition with diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts, e.g. Benassy (1989), Friedman (1988), Simon (1987) etc.
10Like most of the literature, this paper is set in a partial equilibrium framework. Papers
that do analyze price competition in a general equilibrium framework include Dubey (1982)
and Simon (1984).
5The i-th ﬁrm’s strategy consists of simultaneously choosing both a price
pi ∈ F and an output qi ∈ [0,∞).11 All ﬁrms move simultaneously. We
solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
We then specify the residual (or the contingent) demand function. Let
Ri(P,Q) denote the residual demand facing the i-th ﬁrm when the price and
the quantity vectors are given by P = {p1,···,pn}, and Q = {q1,···,qn}.
Deﬁne p to be the minimum element in P such that at least some of the
ﬁrms charging this price has a strictly positive level of output. Then if the
total production of all ﬁrms charging p is greater than d(p), then we assume
that all ﬁrms who charge a price greater than p obtain no demand, thus
ensuring that Ri(P,Q) is indeed a residual demand function. Moreover, for
any price p, the sum of the residual demands facing all the ﬁrms charging
this price p can be at most d(p).
We then impose some more structure on the residual demand function.
Assumption 3(i) is a restriction on the rationing rule, whereas Assumption
3(ii) is a restriction on the tie-breaking rule. (In Appendix 2 we provide an
example of a residual demand function satisfying Assumption 3.)
Assumption 3. (i) Let ri(pi,p,n) denote the residual demand facing the
i-th ﬁrm if, ﬁrm i charges a price pi ≥ p, and the other (n−1) ﬁrms charge
p and produce
d(p)
n . Then ri(pi,p,n) is twice diﬀerentiable, decreasing and






(ii) Consider a situation where m of the ﬁrms charge ˜ p, and all other
ﬁrms either charge prices that are strictly greater than ˜ p, or charge prices
that are strictly lower than ˜ p, but have an output level of zero. Then the
residual demand facing all the ﬁrms charging ˜ p is at least
d(˜ p)
m .
(a) The residual demand facing the i-th ﬁrm charging ˜ p is exactly
d(˜ p)
m
11Grossman (1981) and Mandy (1993), among others, consider a model where ﬁrms use
supply schedules as strategies.
6whenever the other ﬁrms charging ˜ p supply at least
d(˜ p)
m .
(b) If k (≤ m) of the m ﬁrms charging ˜ p supplies nothing, then the
residual demand facing the other m − k ﬁrms charging ˜ p is at least
d(˜ p)
m−k.
The residual demand facing such a ﬁrm is exactly
d(˜ p)
m−k whenever the other
ﬁrms charging ˜ p and supplying a positive amount, supply at least
d(˜ p)
m−k.
We next relate Assumption 3 to the literature.
To begin with we claim that Assumption 3(i) is satisﬁed by ‘all’ rationing
rules, except the proportional one. Using the combined rationing rule intro-




d(p) +λ], 0}, where λ ∈ [0,1]. Note that for
λ = 1 we have the eﬃcient rationing rule, whereas for λ = 0 we have the pro-
portional rationing rule. For intermediate values of λ other rationing rules
emerge.12 Clearly, if d(pi) is concave then ri(pi,p,n) is decreasing and con-
cave in pi.13 Moreover, notice that limn→∞ r0
i(pi,p,n)|pi=p = λd0(p). Hence
∀λ > 0, limn→∞ r0
i(pi,p,n)|pi=p < 0. Thus Assumption 3(i) is satisﬁed by
‘all’ rationing rules barring the proportional one.
We then consider Assumption 3(ii). Observe that the ﬁrms charging ˜ p
cannot increase the residual demand coming to them by increasing their
output level beyond
d(˜ p)
m . Thus Assumption 3(ii) formalizes the notion that
the residual demand function is ‘non-manipulable’.
It is easy to see that Assumption 3(ii) is not inconsistent with Maskin
(1986), which provides one of the most general formulations of the tie-
breaking rule.14 In fact, the second of the two examples of tie-breaking
12See Tasn´ adi (1999b) for an interpretation of the combined rationing rule.
13This follows since ri(pi,p,n) can be re-written as max{d(pi)[1 −
n−1
n (1 − λ)] −
λ(n−1)
n d(p)], 0}.
14In fact papers that solve for mixed strategy price equilibria often imposes very weak
restrictions on the tie-breaking rule e.g. Allen and Hellwig (1986), Maskin (1986), Vives
(1986) etc., though there are some exceptions e.g. Allen and Hellwig (1993), Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986b), Osborne and Pitchik (1986), etc.
7rules in Maskin (1986) is very similar to Assumption 3(ii). If n = 2, and
both the ﬁrms charge ˜ p, then this tie-breaking rule speciﬁes that the residual
demand facing the i-th ﬁrm is αid(˜ p), where αi is some exogenously given
weight. Clearly, if the weights are symmetric then the residual demand is
simply
d(˜ p)
2 .15 In contrast to Assumption 3(ii), however, this formulation
does not allow for the possibility that if one of the ﬁrms supplies less than
d(˜ p)
2 , then the unmet residual demand may spill-over to other ﬁrm, so that
the residual demand facing the other ﬁrm may be greater than
d(˜ p)
2 .
Such spill-overs of unmet residual demand is, in fact, explicitly allowed
for by Davidson and Deneckere (1986) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).16
Both these papers consider a duopoly model. The residual demand facing
ﬁrm i, when p1 = p2, is assumed to be max{
d(pi)
2 ,d(pi) − qj}. Clearly, the
residual demand facing ﬁrm i is independent of the amount produced by ﬁrm
i, so that it is ‘non-manipulable’. Moreover, if qj <
d(pi)
2 , then the residual
demand facing ﬁrm i is strictly greater than
d(pi)
2 . Thus the tie-breaking
rule adopted in the present paper can be considered to be a generalization
of the Davidson-Deneckere-Kreps-Scheinkman one.
While Assumption 3(ii) is consistent with much of the literature, it is, of
course, a serious restriction. There are quite a few papers in the literature
where the tie-breaking rule is ‘manipulable’, e.g. Allen and Hellwig (1993),
Osborne and Pitchik (1986) and Tasn´ adi (1999b).17
The supply function of a ﬁrm charging a price p is given by min{c0−1(p),
Ri(P,Q)}.18 Thus we follow Edgeworth (1897) in assuming that ﬁrms are
15This formulation is, in fact, adopted by Dixon (1984), Levitan and Shubik (1972)
and Yoshida (2002). It is also widely used in the literature on Bertrand-Chamberlin price
competition where the ﬁrms are assumed to supply the whole of the demand coming to
them, e.g. Dastidar (1995), Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), Vives (1999), etc.
16This tie-breaking rule is also discussed in Vives (1999).
17Roy Chowdhury (2000) examines a Bertrand-Edgeworth model where the tie-breaking
rule is ‘manipulable’.
18Since the cost function is strictly convex, c
0−1(p) is well deﬁned.
8free to supply less than the quantity demanded, rather than Chamberlin
(1933), who assumes that ﬁrms meet the whole of the demand coming to
them.
Next let p∗ be the minimum p ∈ F such that p > c0(0).19 Thus p∗ is the
minimum price on the grid which is strictly greater than c0(0). Since p∗ ∈ F,
let p∗ = pj for some integer j. We are going to argue that for n large, p∗
can be sustained as the unique Nash equilibrium price of this game.
Moreover, let q∗ = c0−1(p∗) and let n∗ be the smallest possible integer
such that ∀N ≥ n∗,
d(p∗)
N
< c0−1(p∗) = q∗.
Thus for all N greater than n∗, if a ﬁrm charges p∗ and sells
d(p∗)
N , then the
price p∗ is strictly greater than marginal costs.









Deﬁnition. N1 = max{n∗, ˆ n}.
We next deﬁne ˜ π to be the proﬁt of a ﬁrm that charges p∗ and sells
d(p∗)
n∗ .






n∗ < q∗, it follows that ˜ π > −c(0),
where −c(0) denotes the proﬁt of a ﬁrm which does not produce at all.
Now consider some pi ∈ F, such that pi > p∗. Let qi satisfy pi = c0(qi).
Next consider a ﬁrm that charges pi and sells
d(pi)
k . Clearly the proﬁt of





We then deﬁne ni to be the smallest possible integer such that ∀k ≥ ni,
d(pi)







) < ˜ π.21


























∗,n) < 0 (Assumption 3(i)), this term is
negative.
21Clearly the left hand side of this inequality is decreasing in k. Moreover, as k goes to
9Suppose that in any equilibrium the number of ﬁrms charging pi, say ˜ m,
is greater than or equal to ni. Then at least one of these ﬁrms would have
a residual demand that is less than or equal to
d(pi)
˜ m . Since
d(pi)
˜ m < c0−1(pi),
this ﬁrm would sell at most
d(pi)
˜ m and have a proﬁt less than ˜ π.
Let pk be the largest price belonging to F such that pk ≤ pmax.
Deﬁnition. N2 =
P
i=j+1,···,k ni + n∗ − 1.22
Proposition 1 below provides a resolution of the Edgeworth paradox.
Proposition 1. Let n ≥ max{N1,N2}. Then the unique equilibrium
involves all the ﬁrms charging a price of p∗, and producing
d(p∗)
n .
Proof. Existence. From the deﬁnition of p∗ undercutting is not prof-
itable. We then argue that for the i-th ﬁrm, charging a higher price, pi, is
not proﬁtable either.
Notice that since n ≥ n∗,
d(p∗)
n < c0−1(p∗). Hence for any pi ≥ p∗,
c0−1(pi) ≥ c0−1(p∗) >
d(p∗)
n
= ri(p∗,p∗,n) ≥ ri(pi,p∗,n), (1)
where the equality follows from Assumption 3(ii)(a) and the last inequality
follows from Assumption 3(i). Since c0−1(pi) > ri(pi,p∗,n), for any pi ≥ p∗,
the deviant ﬁrm always supplies the whole of the residual demand coming
to it. Hence the proﬁt of a ﬁrm which charges a price pi (≥ p∗)





i(pi,p∗,n)[pi − c0(ri(pi,p∗,n))] + ri(pi,p∗,n). (3)
inﬁnity, this term goes to −c(0) ≤ 0. Thus ni is well deﬁned.
22Notice that the assumption that the demand function intersects the price axis is
required for this deﬁnition, i.e. while proving uniqueness. It is not required in any of the
existence proofs.
10Next from equation (1) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, pi > c0(ri(pi,p∗,n)). Hence












This follows since from Assumption 3(ii)(a) we know that ri(p∗,p∗,n) =
d(p∗)
n . Since n ≥ ˆ n, we have that
∂π(pi,ri(pi,p∗,n))
∂pi |pi=p∗ < 0. Next, from the
concavity of π(pi,ri(pi,p∗,n)) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, the proﬁt of any
deviant ﬁrm is decreasing in pi.
Finally, given that all ﬁrms supply
d(p∗)
n , the residual demand facing all
ﬁrms is exactly
d(p∗)
n (Assumption 3(ii)(a)). Given that
d(p∗)
n < c0−1(q∗), it
is optimal for all the ﬁrms to produce exactly
d(p∗)
n .
Uniqueness. The proof is in several steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst claim that there cannot be an equilibrium where the
output level of some of the ﬁrms is zero. This follows since these ﬁrms can
always charge p∗ and obtain a residual demand of at least
d(p∗)
n (Assumption
3(ii)). Since p∗ > c0(0), producing a small enough positive output would
increase their proﬁt from −c(0).
Step 2. We then argue that there cannot be some pi (∈ F) > p∗, such
that some of the ﬁrms charge pi and supply a positive amount.
Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists.
This implies that the total number of ﬁrms charging p∗, say ˜ n, can be
at most n∗ −1. Otherwise the residual demand facing these ﬁrms would be
exactly
d(p∗)
˜ n .24 Since
d(p∗)


























˜ n < c
0−1(p
∗), all ﬁrms must be supplying at least
d(p∗)
˜ n . The assertion
11the residual demand at any higher price, pi, would be zero.
Now consider some pi > p∗. Clearly, the number of ﬁrms charging pi is
less than ni. Otherwise, some of these ﬁrms would have a proﬁt less than
˜ π. Hence such a ﬁrm would have an incentive to deviate to p∗, when it can
supply at least
d(p∗)
n∗ and earn ˜ π. Thus the total number of ﬁrms producing
a strictly positive amount is less than N2, thereby contradicting step 1.
The idea behind the existence result is quite simple. Consider a market
price of p∗. If the number of ﬁrms is large then the residual demand com-
ing to every ﬁrm is very small, so that it is residual demand rather than
marginal cost which determines ﬁrm supply. In that case price would not
equal marginal cost, and ﬁrms may no longer have an incentive to increase
its price level. Assumption 3 speciﬁes a set of conditions under which this
is indeed true.
We next examine the limit properties of the equilibrium as the grid size
becomes small and the number of ﬁrms becomes large. To begin with notice
that limα→0 p∗(α) = c0(0) and limn→∞
d(p∗(α))
n = 0. Thus in the limit the
equilibrium price approaches the competitive one and the output of each
ﬁrm becomes vanishingly small.
Hence our results provide a non-cooperative foundation for the the-
ory of perfect competition. In fact, given α, it is suﬃcient to take n ≥
max{N1(α),N2(α)} in order to ensure that the equilibrium price is p∗, so
that p∗ is sustainable for a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms.25 This is similar in spirit
to the well known result that with linear cost functions the competitive price
is obtained whenever n ≥ 2.
Allen and Hellwig (1986) demonstrate that if the ﬁrms are capacity con-
now follows from Assumption 3(ii)(a).
25However, under some simplifying assumptions it is easy to show that limα→0 N1(α) =
∞. Assume that infp∈[0,pmax] [limn→∞ r
0
i(p,p,n)] ≥ −B, where B > 0. (Note that this
condition is satisﬁed for the parallel residual demand function). It is now straightforward
to show that limα→0 ˆ n(α) = ∞.
12strained and the residual demand function is proportional, then, in the limit,
the mixed strategy equilibrium converges in distribution to the competitive
price. Vives (1986) proves that in case the residual demand is parallel, the
convergence is in support as well. For the parallel rationing rule B¨ orgers
(1992) shows that iterated elimination of dominated strategies yields prices
close to the competitive price.
Dixon (1987, 1990, 1993) also study the limit properties of pure strategy
Bertrand equilibria when the economy is replicated. Dixon (1987) shows
that any epsilon-Nash equilibrium will be approximately competitive if ep-
silon is small enough and the industry is large enough. Dixon (1990) demon-
strates that if the industry is large enough then the competitive price will
be an equilibrium. Moreover, if costs of turning away consumers are small,
then all equilibria will be close to the competitive one. Dixon (1993) pro-
vides an example where the highest equilibrium prices could be arbitrarily
far from the competitive price.
Note that in the papers discussed above the limiting procedure involves
taking ﬁrm size, relative to market demand, to zero. In Allen and Hellwig
(1986) and Vives (1986) this is done by taking the capacity level of the ﬁrms
to zero, while in Dixon (1987, 1990, 1993) this is done by replicating the
market demand function. Under our approach, however, ﬁrm size is kept
unchanged.
3 A Two-stage Model
We then examine the case where the ﬁrms produce to order. Thus the ﬁrms
play a two stage game where, in stage 1, the ﬁrms simultaneously announce
their prices, and in stage 2, they simultaneously decide on their output levels.
In Proposition 2 below we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of this game (see Appendix 1 for the proof).
13Proposition 2. Assume that n ≥ max{ˆ n,n∗ + 1,N2}. Then the fol-
lowing strategies constitute the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
this game:
Stage 1. All ﬁrms charge a price of p∗.
Stage 2.
Case (i). Suppose that in stage 1 all the ﬁrms charge p∗. Then, in stage
2, all the ﬁrms produce
d(p∗)
n .
Case (ii). Next suppose that in stage 1, (n − 1) of the ﬁrms charge
p∗, while one of the ﬁrms charges a price strictly greater than p∗. Then, in
stage 2, the ﬁrms charging p∗ produce
d(p∗)
n−1 , while the output level of the
other ﬁrm is zero.26
In this case also limα→0 p∗(α) = c0(0) and limn→∞
d(p∗(α))
n = 0, so that
the ‘folk theorem’ goes through under this formulation as well.
4 Asymmetric Costs
In this section we examine the case where ﬁrms are asymmetric.
Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) is one of the very few papers that ex-
amine Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an asymmetric framework. They
26Notice that in Proposition 2 we describe the equilibrium strategies in stage 2 for two
classes of histories only. Under some simplifying assumptions it is easy to write down the
equilibrium strategies in all possible subgames. Assume that the residual demand function
is symmetric, i.e. ri(pi,p,m) = r(pi,p,m), ∀i. Moreover, let the residual demand at any
price pi only depend on quantities produced by ﬁrms who charge prices less than pi. Now
consider the following algorithm.
Step 1. All ﬁrms that charge a price strictly less than p
∗ produce no output.
Step 2. Let the number of ﬁrms charging p
∗ be N
∗. Then the equilibrium output level





Step 3. Let the residual demand facing all ﬁrms who charge a price of pj+1 = p
∗ + α
be at least R
j+1. Then the equilibrium output of all such ﬁrms is min{c
0−1(pj+1),R
j+1}.
We can inductively write down the output level of the ﬁrms who charge higher prices.
14explore a price-setting duopoly with the eﬃcient rationing rule where the
ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of both their unit costs and capacities. They character-
ize the set of equilibria and then, as an application, re-examine the Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983) model with asymmetric costs, demonstrating that
the Cournot equilibrium capacity levels need not emerge in equilibrium. In
keeping with our approach, however, in this section we shall be interested
in the case where the number of ﬁrms is large.
Let there be m types of ﬁrms with the cost function of the l-th type
being cl(q). The number of type l ﬁrms is denoted by nl, where
P
l nl = n.
Next let p∗
l denote the minimum p ∈ F such that p > c0
l(0). Let
ril(pi,p,n) denote the residual demand function facing the i-th ﬁrm of type
l, when it charges pi, and all other ﬁrms charge p (≤ pi) and supply
d(p)
n .
The residual demand function satisﬁes an appropriately modiﬁed version of
Assumption 3.27 Next deﬁne n∗
l , ˆ nl and Nl
1 in a manner analogous to that
of n∗, ˆ n and N1 respectively, only taking care to use the cost function of the
l-th type, cl(q), instead of c(q) in the deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition. ˜ N1 = maxl Nl
1 = max{n∗
1,···,n∗
m, ˆ n1,···, ˆ nm}.













Next consider some px ∈ F, such that px > p∗
l . Let qlx satisfy px =
c0
l(qlx). Clearly if a type l ﬁrm charges px and sells
d(px)
r , then the proﬁt of





We then deﬁne nlx to be the smallest possible integer such that ∀r ≥ nlx,
d(px)







) < ˜ πl.
27Assumption 3(i) should be modiﬁed so that ril(pi,p,n) is twice diﬀerentiable, de-








∂pi . Assumption 3(ii) requires no modiﬁcation.
15Suppose that in any equilibrium the number of ﬁrms charging px, say
˜ m, is greater than or equal to maxq nqx. Then at least one of these ﬁrms,
say of type l, would have a residual demand that is less than or equal to
d(px)
˜ m . Since
d(px)
˜ m < c0−1
l (px), this ﬁrm would supply at most
d(px)
˜ m and have
a proﬁt less than ˜ πl.
For ease of exposition we shall focus on two cases.
Case (i). c0
1(0) = c0
2(0) = ··· = c0
m(0).
Note that if, at a given price, any ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to produce a
strictly positive amount, then so will all other ﬁrms. For this case let us
redeﬁne p∗ = p∗
1 = ··· = p∗
m.
Deﬁnition. ˜ N2 =
P
x=j+1,···,k maxl nlx + maxl n∗
l − 1.
We can now state our next proposition (see Appendix 1 for the proof).
Proposition 3. Let c0
1(0) = c0
2(0) = ··· = c0
m(0). If n ≥ max{ ˜ N1, ˜ N2},




It is easy to see that the ‘folk theorem’ goes through in this case.
Case (ii). c0
1(0) < c0
2(0) < ··· < c0
m(0).
Consider any p such that c0
1(0) < p < c0
2(0). While at this price pro-
ducing a small enough positive level of output is proﬁtable for type 1 ﬁrms,
ﬁrms of other types will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply a positive level of
output. Hence type 1 ﬁrms are, in some sense, the most eﬃcient.
Let p∗
1 = ph (say).
Deﬁnition. ˆ N2 =
P
x=h+1,···,k n1x + n∗
1 − 1.
Proposition 4 below solves for the equilibrium when the number of type
1 ﬁrms is large. The proof, which is quite simple, can be found in the
16Appendix 1.
Proposition 4. Let c0
1(0) < c0
2(0) < ··· < c0
m(0). Assume that α <
c0
2(0) − c0
1(0) and n1 ≥ max{N1
1, ˆ N2}. Then the ‘unique’ equilibrium in-




n1 . Firms of all other
types have an output level of zero.
Interpreting c0
1(0) as the competitive price, the ‘folk theorem’ goes through
in this case as well.
Next suppose that c0
1(0) = c0
2(0) = ··· = c0
j(0) < c0
j+1(0) ≤ ··· ≤ c0
m(0).
Combining Propositions 3 and 4, it is easy to see that if the number of ﬁrms
of type 1 to j are large enough, then there is a unique equilibrium where all
ﬁrms of type 1 to j charge c0
1(0), and all other ﬁrms have an output of zero.
Finally, consider the case when there are a large number of ‘ineﬃcient’
ﬁrms and the ‘eﬃcient’ ﬁrms are relatively few in number. Unfortunately,
no equilibrium may exist even if the number of ineﬃcient ﬁrms is very large.
The following example illustrates the problems involved.
Example. Let there be two types of ﬁrms with c1(q) = q2 and c2(q) =
q + q2, so that c0
1(0) < c0
2(0). There are 2 ﬁrms of type 1 and n2 ﬁrms of
type 2. The demand function is q = 4−p, and the residual demand function
satisﬁes an appropriately modiﬁed version of Assumption 3. In fact, we




First note that for n2 large enough, any possible equilibrium must in-
volve all ﬁrms of type 2 charging the price p∗
2 and supplying the whole of
the residual demand coming to them.28 Given this, the only possible equi-
librium must involve both the type 1 ﬁrms charging c0
2(0) = 1 and supplying
c0−1
1 (1) = 0.5 when they have a proﬁt of 0.25 each.29 Moreover, since both
28The argument essentially mimics the uniqueness part of Proposition 1.
29Given that all type 2 ﬁrms are charging p
∗
2, in equilibrium the type 1 ﬁrms cannot be
17the type 1 ﬁrms supply c0−1
1 (1) = 0.5, the total amount supplied by the type
2 ﬁrms will be 1.99 (= 4−p∗
2−1). Next suppose that a type 1 ﬁrms deviates
to 1.02 (= p∗
2 + α). Given that the rationing rule is eﬃcient, it can supply
the residual demand 0.49 (= 4 − p∗
2 − α − 1.99 − 0.5) and increase its proﬁt
level to 0.2597. Hence no equilibrium exists.30
5 Conclusion
In this paper we re-examine the non-existence problem associated with pure
strategy Nash equilibrium under price competition.
Comparison with Dixon (1993) suggests some interesting conclusions re-
garding the impact of the replication procedure on the equilibrium outcomes.
If one replicates ﬁrms but not demand, then the present paper shows that
for a suﬃciently large market there is a unique Nash equilibrium. More-
over, in the limit, as the grid size goes to zero, and the number of ﬁrms
becomes large, the equilibrium price converges to the competitive one, i.e.
the ‘folk theorem’ of perfect competition holds. Whereas if one replicates
both demand and ﬁrms, then Dixon (1993) shows that the Nash equilibrium
is non-unique and it exists for a large parameter class whenever the industry
is large enough. Moreover, the ‘folk theorem’ fails, at least in some cases.
Thus the results are sensitive to the choice of the replication procedure.
charging a price strictly greater than p
∗
2, since in that case the type 1 ﬁrms will have no
demand. Whereas if they charge a price strictly lower than c
0
2(0), then their proﬁt will
be lower compared to what they obtain from charging c
0
2(0). For n
2 large enough, their
proﬁt from charging c
0
2(0) is also lower, since they will have to share the demand at price
c
0
2(0) with the type 2 ﬁrms.
30The example extends in a straightforward manner to all α of the form 10
−I, where I
is some positive integer greater than 1.
186 Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 2. Existence. We ﬁrst argue that the quantity decisions
are optimal. Suppose that in stage 1 all the ﬁrms charge p∗. Then given that
all other ﬁrms produce
d(p∗)
n , the residual demand facing ﬁrm i is also
d(p∗)
n




Next consider the case where (n − 1) of the ﬁrms charge p∗. Clearly,
given that all other ﬁrms produce
d(p∗)
n−1 , the residual demand facing the i-th
ﬁrm charging p∗ is also
d(p∗)
n−1 (Assumption 3(ii)(a)). Since n − 1 ≥ n∗, it
follows that
d(p∗)




The pricing decision is also optimal since if any of the ﬁrms increase its
price then, in stage 2, the output level of the other ﬁrms are such that the
deviant ﬁrm has zero residual demand.
Uniqueness. It is easy to see that we cannot have an equilibrium where
the output level of some of the ﬁrms is zero, since it can always charge p∗
in stage 1 and supply
d(p∗)
n in stage 2.
Next observe that the deﬁnitions of ˜ π, ni and n∗ are valid for this case
also. Hence we can mimic step 2 of the uniqueness part of Proposition 1 to
argue that the only price that is sustainable in equilibrium is p∗.
Proof of Proposition 3. Existence. Undercutting p∗ is clearly not prof-
itable. We then argue that for the i-th ﬁrm of type l, charging a higher
price, pi, is not proﬁtable either.




l (p∗). Hence for any pi ≥ p∗,
c0−1




= ril(p∗,p∗,n) ≥ ril(pi,p∗,n). (5)
Since c0−1
l (pi) > ril(pi,p∗,n), the deviant ﬁrm supplies the whole of the
residual demand coming to it. Hence the proﬁt of a ﬁrm which charges a
19price pi (≥ p∗)







Next from equation (5) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, pi > c0
l(ril(pi,p∗,n)).
Hence from the concavity of ril(pi,p∗,n) it follows that πl(pi,ril(pi,p∗,n))












This follows since from an analogue of Assumption 3(ii)(a) we know that
ril(p∗,p∗,n) =
d(p∗)
n . Since n ≥ ˆ nl, we have that
∂πl(pi,ril(pi,p∗,n))
∂pi |pi=p∗ < 0.
Next, from the concavity of πl(pi,ril(pi,p∗,n)) it follows that ∀pi ≥ p∗, the
proﬁt of any deviant ﬁrm is decreasing in pi.
Finally, given that all other ﬁrms supply
d(p∗)
n , the residual demand





l (q∗), ∀l, it is optimal for
all the ﬁrms to produce exactly
d(p∗)
n .
Uniqueness. Step 1. We can ﬁrst mimic the proof of Proposition 1 to
argue that there cannot be an equilibrium where the output level of some
of the ﬁrms is zero.
Step 2. We then demonstrate that there cannot be some py (∈ F) > p∗,
such that some of the ﬁrms charge py and supply a positive amount.
Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists.
This implies that the total number of ﬁrms charging p∗, say ˜ n, can be at
most maxq n∗
q − 1. Otherwise, ˜ n ≥ maxq n∗
q and the residual demand facing
all these ﬁrms would be exactly
d(p∗)
˜ n .31 Since
d(p∗)
˜ n < c0−1
l (p∗), ∀l, all such
31Given that
d(p∗)
˜ n < c
0−1
l (p
∗), ∀l, all ﬁrms must be supplying at least
d(p∗)
˜ n . The
assertion now follows from an analogue of Assumption 3(ii)(b).
20ﬁrms would supply
d(p∗)
˜ n and the residual demand at any higher price would
be zero.
Now consider some py > p∗. Clearly, the number of ﬁrms charging py
is less than maxq nqy. Otherwise, some of these ﬁrms, say of type l, would
have a proﬁt less than ˜ πl. Hence such a ﬁrm would have an incentive to
deviate to p∗, when it can supply at least
d(p∗)
maxq n∗
q and earn ˜ πl. Thus the
total number of ﬁrms producing a strictly positive amount is less than ˜ N2,
thereby contradicting step 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the proposition the term unique is within
quotes because the outcome is unique up to the strategies of type 1 ﬁrms.
Firms of all other types can charge any price and supply an output of zero.
This will not aﬀect the outcome.
Existence. Notice that since α < c0
2(0) − c0
1(0), it follows that ∀i ≥ 2,
p∗
1 < c0
i(0). Thus no ﬁrm of type i, where i ≥ 2 can proﬁtably charge a price
of p∗
1 and produce a strictly positive output level. For type 1 ﬁrms we can
simply mimic the proof in Proposition 1 to claim that they cannot have a
proﬁtable deviation.
Uniqueness. First note that there cannot be an equilibrium where the
output level of some of the type 1 ﬁrms is zero.
We then argue that there cannot be some px (∈ F) > p∗
1, such that some
of the type 1 ﬁrms charge px and supply a positive amount. Suppose to the
contrary that such a price exists.
This implies that the total number of type 1 ﬁrms charging p∗
1, say ˜ n, can
be at most n∗




˜ n .32 Since ˜ n ≥ n∗
1, we have that
d(p∗
1)
˜ n < c0−1
1 (p∗
1). Hence all
such ﬁrms would supply
d(p∗)
˜ n and the residual demand at any higher price,
32First note that ﬁrms of type j > 1, even if they charge p
∗
1, would have an output of
zero. Thus the residual demand facing all ﬁrms of type 1 charging p
∗




Assumption 3(ii)). Given that
d(p∗
1)
˜ n < c
0−1
1 (p




˜ n . The assertion now follows from an analogue of Assumption 3(ii)(a).
21px, would be zero.
Next consider some px > p∗
1. Clearly, the number of type 1 ﬁrms charging
px is less than n1x. Otherwise, one of the type 1 ﬁrms would have a residual





l (px), this ﬁrm
would supply at most
d(px)
n1x and have a proﬁt less than ˜ π1. Hence such a ﬁrm
would have an incentive to deviate to p∗





and earn ˜ π1. Thus the total number of ﬁrms producing a strictly positive
amount is less than ˆ N2, a contradiction.
7 Appendix 2
In this appendix we provide an example of a residual demand function sat-
isfying Assumption 3 when there are three ﬁrms, 1, 2 and 3.
If #{k : pk = p1} = 1, then













qj − qk|pk=p1, k6=1].
If #{k : pk = p1} = 3 and either q2,q3 ≤
d(p1)






,d(p1) − q2 − q3].
If #{k : pk = p1} = 3 and qj ≤
d(p1)
3 , qk >
d(p1)




,d(p1) − qj − qk].
It is clear that the associated rationing rule is eﬃcient, while the asso-
ciated tie-breaking rule is a generalization the Davidson-Deneckere-Kreps-
Scheinkman one.
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